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ACCOMMODATING PREGNANCY FIVE YEARS AFTER
YOUNG V. UPS: WHERE WE ARE & WHERE WE SHOULD GO
NICOLE BUONOCORE PORTER*
ABSTRACT
This Article will explore how pregnant employees fare when they are denied
accommodations in the workplace that would have allowed them to work safely
through their pregnancies. The two most commonly used legal avenues for
pregnant plaintiffs are the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Successful cases under the ADA were
rare until Congress expanded the ADA’s definition of disability in 2008. PDA
claims became easier after the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Young v.
United Parcel Service, Inc. This Article will analyze both the body of PDA cases
decided since Young, and all of the ADA cases where pregnancy is the claimed
disability since the ADA was amended in 2008. Although the picture isn’t quite
rosy for pregnant plaintiffs, it is perhaps more positive than many scholars
predicted it would be. Nevertheless, there remain many gaps in protection—
some caused by the statutes’ limitations—but many caused by litigants’ and
judges’ inability (or unwillingness) to properly interpret these two statutes. This
Article will explain where we are and explore options for where we should go in
the future.

* Nicole Buonocore Porter, Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. This Article
was written as part of a symposium that was to be hosted by Saint Louis University School of Law
and the Journal. Although the in-person meeting was cancelled because of COVID-19, I appreciate
the opportunity to discuss these important issues in written format.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although many (if not most) pregnancies proceed without complications,
many pregnant women will need some modifications to their jobs when they are
pregnant, 1 especially if their jobs are physically rigorous. These modifications
(often called “accommodations”) might be as simple as taking extra breaks 2 to
drink water, 3 sit down to rest, or use the restroom; sitting on a stool instead of
standing for an entire shift; 4 or a bit more complicated, such as a waiver from
all heavy lifting. But employers often refuse to provide accommodations for
pregnancy, leaving pregnant employees performing tasks that are detrimental to
the health and well-being of their pregnancies 5 or being forced to take leave
(often unpaid) when they could be working with minor adjustments to their jobs.
Employers’ refusal to provide accommodations for pregnancy falls more harshly
on women in low-income jobs 6 and on women in historically male professions
like firefighting, construction work, and law enforcement. 7 Many of these
women lose their jobs because of their employers’ refusal to accommodate the
limitations caused by their pregnancies. 8 In addition to the hardship borne by
these women and their families, the failure of employers to accommodate their
pregnant employees “indirectly contributes to occupational sex segregation by
discouraging other women from pursuing jobs that they risk losing when they

1. Thelma L. Harmon, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.: The Equal Treatment Fallacy,
20 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 97, 106 (2017) (noting that 71% of pregnant workers need more
breaks; 61% need schedule changes; 53% need a change in job duties to allow more sitting or less
lifting; 40% need other types of workplace adjustments).
2. See, for example, Colas v. City Univ. N.Y., 17-CV-4825 (NGG) (JO), 2019 WL 2028701,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2019), where the plaintiff was harassed for taking restroom breaks and
having to sit down. She eventually quit, claiming constructive discharge. Id. at *2.
3. See Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08–1244–EFM, 2009 WL 1617669, at *1 (D.
Kan. June 9, 2009), where a pregnant employee lost her job because drinking water while working
violated store policy.
4. See Stephanie A. Pisko, Towards Reasonable: The Rise of State Pregnancy
Accommodation Laws, 23 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147, 153 (2016) (giving the example of a bank
teller whose pregnancy caused swollen feet and high blood pressure, so her doctor recommended
that she sit on a stool).
5. See, for example, Thomas v. Fla. Pars. Juv. Just. Comm’n, No. 18-2921, 2019 WL
118011, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 7, 2019), where the plaintiff was refused a waiver from completing a
1.5-mile run test while she was pregnant. Attempting the run led to her experiencing severe pain
and having to be transported to the emergency room. Id. at *2–3. See also Harmon, supra note 2,
at 106 (stating that many women never ask for the accommodations they need).
6. Pisko, supra note 5, at 154 (stating that a narrow reading of the PDA has had negative
consequences for low-income women, who need to continue to work during their pregnancies and
cannot afford to take leave).
7. Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as “Disability” and the Amended Americans with Disabilities
Act, 53 B.C. L. REV. 443, 454 (2012).
8. Id.
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become pregnant.” 9 If a pregnant employee wants to challenge these actions, the
two most common legal avenues are the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) 10 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA). 11
Although claims under both of these statutes were rarely successful, 12 two
legal developments have contributed to their increased success. First, the ADA
was amended in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009) to dramatically expand the
definition of disability. 13 And second, in 2015, the Supreme Court decided a
case, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 14 that made it easier for pregnant
employees to seek accommodations under the PDA. We are now five years past
that decision in Young. Thus, this is a good time to see where we are and to
attempt to draw some conclusions about where we should be.
Specifically, this Article will analyze the body of cases decided since the
Young v. UPS decision, and all of the ADA cases where pregnancy is the claimed
disability since the ADA was amended in 2008. Although the picture is not quite
rosy for pregnant plaintiffs, it is perhaps more positive than many scholars
predicted it would be. Nevertheless, there remain many gaps in protection—
some caused by the statutes’ limitations—but many caused by litigants’ and
judges’ inability (or unwillingness) to properly interpret these two statutes. This
Article will explain where we are and explore options for where we should go
in the future.
This Article proceeds in four additional parts. Part II will provide a brief
history of pregnancy discrimination and accommodation protections,
proceeding chronologically from the passage of the PDA in 1978, through the
passage of the ADA in 1990 and the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) in 2008,
and finally, to the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Young v. UPS. Part III will
discuss all of the cases decided under the PDA since Young, as well as the ADA
cases discussing pregnancy as a disability. Finally, Part IV will attempt to draw
some conclusions from the cases discussed in Part III, and, perhaps more
importantly, will provide some advice for how these protections might be more
successful in the future for assisting pregnant women in receiving the
accommodations they need in the workplace. Part V will briefly conclude.
9. Id.
10. The ADA requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations to individuals with
disabilities as long as those accommodations do not cause an undue hardship. 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5)(A).
11. As will be discussed below, the PDA requires employers to treat pregnant women the same
as other workers who are similar in their ability or inability to work. Thus, courts have sometimes
treated the PDA as requiring employers to provide some accommodations to pregnant workers.
This is discussed in more detail infra Parts II.A, C.
12. John C. Williams et al., A Sip of Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodation After the ADA
Amendments Act, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 111 (2013).
13. Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans With Disabilities Act:
Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 218 (2008).
14. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206 (2015).
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II. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS
A.

Enactment and Early Days of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act

The PDA was passed in 1978, as an amendment to Title VII. 15 It was a
reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 16 in
which the Court held that an employer’s otherwise comprehensive temporary
disability policy that excluded pregnancy was not sex discrimination under Title
VII. 17 The Court reasoned that because not all women are or will become
pregnant, and because the employer’s policy at issue did not discriminate against
all women, pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimination. 18
Congress disagreed and passed the PDA 19 in 1978. The PDA amends the
definition of “sex” under Title VII and has two clauses. 20 The first clause makes
explicit that discrimination based on sex includes discrimination because of
“pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 21 So a refusal to hire a
pregnant woman because she is pregnant would be unlawful sex discrimination
under Title VII. But the second clause does more—it provides that “women
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work.” 22
After the PDA was passed, courts differed regarding how to interpret the
PDA’s second clause. 23 Some courts held that employer policies that were
“pregnancy blind,” such as policies that reserved light duty positions for
employees with workplace injuries, did not violate the PDA. 24 In other words,
employees who had been given accommodations (often “light duty”) because of

15. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076.
16. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
17. Id. at 145–46.
18. Id. at 136.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See generally Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, A Special Delivery: Litigating Pregnancy
Accommodation Claims after the Supreme Court Decision in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,
68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 683, 684–86 (2016) (discussing courts’ different approaches).
24. Deborah A. Widiss, The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act After Young v. UPS, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1423, 1428 (2017);
Zehrt, supra note 24, at 685 (listing the 4th, 5th, 7th, and 11th Circuits as narrowly interpreting the
second clause; if the employer only offers light duty to those with occupational injuries, they do
not need to offer it to pregnant workers). But see id. (stating that the 6th, 8th, and 10th Circuits
interpreted the PDA more broadly, comparing the relative abilities of pregnant and non-pregnant
workers, rather than the source of injury).
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some “neutral” policy were not appropriate comparators. 25 As one scholar
pointed out, courts often insisted on finding animus against pregnancy before
allowing the plaintiff’s PDA claim; as long as the reason for the accommodation
given to other employees was an external source (such as workers’
compensation laws, the ADA, or a collective bargaining agreement), this
sufficed as a valid reason to treat pregnant women worse than other employees. 26
Many scholars became critical of the PDA, arguing that it could not address the
fact that “pregnant women are ready and able to work, but require some level of
accommodation to maintain their health while performing their job duties at an
adequate level.” 27
B.

Pregnancy as a Disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act
1. Original ADA

The ADA was passed in 1990 with overwhelming support. 28 But it was not
too long before the federal courts, especially the Supreme Court, began narrowly
interpreting the definition of disability. 29 Under the ADA, a disability is defined
as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such
an impairment. 30 Through a series of four Supreme Court decisions, 31 and
25. Using comparators is one of the most common ways of proving discrimination. For
instance, imagine an employer with two employees that perform the exact same job (e.g., cashier
in a grocery store). One is pregnant and the other is not. If the employer allowed the non-pregnant
cashier to take frequent breaks to smoke cigarettes, but refused to let the pregnant worker take
frequent breaks to use the restroom or drink water, the pregnant worker could point to the nonpregnant worker as a comparator to establish that the employer’s refusal to let her take the breaks
was discrimination based on her pregnancy.
26. Deborah L. Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment Discrimination: From Unjustified
Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 GEO. L.J. 559, 580 (2017) [hereinafter
Shifting Sands]; Deborah L. Brake, On Not “Having It Both Ways” and Still Losing: Reflections
on Fifty Years of Pregnancy Litigation Under Title VII, 95 B.U. L. REV. 995, 1001 (2015).
27. See, e.g., Sheerine Alemzadeh, Claiming Disability, Reclaiming Pregnancy: A Critical
Analysis of the ADA’s Pregnancy Exclusion, 27 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 1, 8 (2012).
28. See Long, supra note 14, at 217 (stating that the expectations for the original ADA had
been very high).
29. See Michelle A. Travis, Impairment as Protected Status: A New Universality for Disability
Rights, 46 GA. L. REV. 937, 938 (2012) (stating that Congress enacted the ADAAA to overturn a
set of United States Supreme Court decisions that narrowly interpreted the definition of disability).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
31. The first three decisions (called the “Sutton trilogy”) held that, when determining if
someone has a disability, that person’s impairment should be considered in its mitigated state—
i.e., with any medication or assistive devices that ameliorate the effect of the person’s impairment.
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1999) (holding that fully correctable
myopia is not a disability using the just-announced mitigating measures rule); Murphy v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (holding that the plaintiff’s hypertension, which was
lowered with medication, was not a disability); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555,
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hundreds of lower-court decisions, conditions such as diabetes, cancer, AIDS,
bipolar disorder, multiple sclerosis, monocular vision, epilepsy, cerebral palsy,
and intellectual disabilities were all found not to be disabilities under the original
ADA. 32 Scholars referred to the courts as having engaged in a “backlash” against
the ADA. 33 In fact, one study demonstrated that employers had prevailed in
ninety-two percent of ADA cases filed in court. 34
Thus, it should not be surprising that, under the original ADA, courts did not
often consider pregnancy to be a disability. 35 In fact, as stated by one scholar,
before the ADAAA was passed, courts routinely denied ADA coverage to
pregnant women who experienced limitations during pregnancy, such as severe
headaches, dizziness, vomiting, extreme fatigue, and the need to curtail heavy
lifting and exposure to hazardous chemicals. 36 Courts thought that pregnancy
was “normal” 37 and, if anything, represented heightened rather than diminished
biological functioning. 38 Moreover, the Toyota Court’s “long-term or
permanent” requirement to establishing a covered disability made it almost
impossible for courts to see pregnancy (which is, inevitably, not permanent or
long-term) as a disability. 39 And most scholars were not advocating for the ADA
to cover pregnancy as a disability because they were worried that providing

565–66 (1999) (holding that the plaintiff’s monocular vision was not a per se disability and the
court on remand should consider whether the plaintiff’s brain’s ability to cope with his monocular
vision renders it not substantially limiting). The fourth decision clarified the correct meaning of
“substantially limits” and “major life activities.” See Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184,
197–98 (2002). The Court held that the ADA only applies to major life activities that are of “central
importance to most people’s daily lives.” Id. at 197. In defining “substantially limits” in the
definition of disability, the Court stated: “We therefore hold that to be substantially limited in
performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts
the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives. The
impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long term.” Id. at 198.
32. Nicole Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2014).
33. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LABOR L. 19, 22 (2006); SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, DISABLING
INTERPRETATIONS: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN FEDERAL COURT 48–58 (2005).
34. RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT 79 (2005). See also Williams et al., supra note 13, at 111 (stating that by
2006, defendants were winning ninety-seven percent of all ADA cases resolved in court).
35. See Alemzadeh, supra note 28, at 6 (citing to several cases pre-ADAAA where courts held
that pregnancy is not a disability).
36. Cox, supra note 8, at 446–47.
37. Alemzadeh, supra note 28, at 9–10 (stating that courts often engaged in the effort of trying
to distinguish normal from abnormal pregnancies).
38. Cox, supra note 8, at 447.
39. Alemzadeh, supra note 28, at 10.
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pregnancy coverage under the ADA would reinstate outdated views that
women’s physical differences are deficiencies. 40
2. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008
Because Congress was unhappy with the narrowed definition of disability,
it passed the ADAAA, which went into effect on January 1, 2009. 41 The
ADAAA did not change the basic definition of disability. 42 Instead, it included
several rules of construction to assist courts in interpreting the definition of
disability in conformity with the broad definition Congress envisioned. 43
Most relevant to this Article, the ADAAA’s main changes included:
overruling the “mitigating measures” rule announced in the Sutton trilogy of
cases, 44 disagreeing with the Toyota Court’s stringent definition of
“substantially limits”, 45 and broadening the definition of “major life
activities.” 46 With regard to the expansion of the definition of major life
activities, the inclusion of work-related tasks like standing, lifting, and bending
can help pregnant women because restrictions on such activities are common
during pregnancy. 47 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
issued regulations implementing the ADAAA, which became effective on May
24, 2011. 48 The regulations accomplished several things; the one most relevant

40. Cox, supra note 8, at 448. See also Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously,
91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 1076–77 (2015) (noting that many believed that women’s status would
be demeaned by comparing pregnancy to disability).
41. Long, supra note 14, at 217.
42. Id. at 218.
43. Porter, supra note 33, at 15.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i) (stating that the determination of whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of
mitigating measures such as: medication, medical supplies, hearing aids, assistive technology, etc.).
45. See id. §§ 12102(4)(A), (B) (stating that the definition of disability shall be construed in
favor of broad coverage, but ultimately punting on the definition of “substantially limits” and
instead deferring to the EEOC to define the phrase). See also Williams et al., supra note 13, at 115
(stating that the ADAAA eases the burden on plaintiffs proving that their major life activities were
substantially limited).
46. Prior to the ADAAA, the statute itself did not define major life activities; instead, the
EEOC had provided a fairly narrow definition. The ADAAA defines major life activities in the
statute itself to include: “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating,
sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating,
thinking, communicating and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). It also states that major life
activities include “the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions
of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain,
respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.” Id. § 12102(2)(B).
47. Cox, supra note 8, at 461.
48. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 58, 16978 (Mar. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630).
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to pregnancy is that the regulations state: “The effects of an impairment lasting
or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting within the
meaning of this section.” 49
Below, I will discuss the post-ADAAA cases considering whether
pregnancy constitutes a disability. 50 As for the literature on pregnancy as a
disability, scholars are divided on whether they believe that pregnancy should
be a disability. 51 But a lengthy discussion of the theoretical arguments for and
against classifying pregnancy as a disability is beyond the scope of this Article.
C. 2015: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Young v. UPS
The landscape of pregnancy accommodations changed when the Supreme
Court decided Young v. UPS. 52 The plaintiff, Peggy Young, was a part-time
driver for UPS, where her duties included pickup and delivery of packages that
had arrived by air the prior night. 53 After several miscarriages, she finally
became pregnant in 2006. 54 Because of her history of miscarriages, her doctor
advised her to avoid lifting more than twenty pounds during the first twenty
weeks of her pregnancy and more than ten pounds thereafter. 55 Because UPS
required drivers to be able to lift parcels weighing up to seventy pounds, UPS
told Young that she could not work with her lifting restriction. 56 Accordingly,
she was placed on unpaid leave most of her pregnancy and eventually lost her
medical coverage. 57
Young brought a lawsuit under the PDA, arguing that UPS accommodated
other drivers who were similar in their ability or inability to work. 58 In doing so,
she pointed to several classes of individuals who were accommodated by UPS,
which included (1) those with workplace injuries, (2) those who had disabilities
as defined by the ADA, and (3) those who lost their Department of

49. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2019). See also Cox, supra note 8, at 462–63 (discussing the
importance of the relaxing of the durational requirements); Williams et al., supra note 13, at 114.
50. See infra Part III.A.
51. Compare Alemzadeh, supra note 28, at 1, 16 (arguing in favor of pregnancy being
considered a disability), Cox, supra note 8 (same), and Harmon, supra note 2, at 138 (stating that
pregnancy should be viewed as a variation of a disability and not an anomaly), with Bradley A.
Areheart, Accommodating Pregnancy, 67 ALA. L. REV. 1125, 1163–66 (2016) (discussing the
problems associated with classifying pregnancy as a disability).
52. 575 U.S. 206 (2015).
53. Id. at 211.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Young, 575 U.S. at 211.
58. Id.
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Transportation (DOT) certifications. 59 After discovery, UPS filed a motion for
summary judgment, and the district court granted it, concluding that UPS offered
a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for not accommodating Young—because
she did not fall into any of the pregnancy-blind categories of employees for
which UPS provides accommodations. 60 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, stating
that Young’s comparators (all three classes of employees who were
accommodated according to UPS’s policies) were not “similarly situated” to
Young because their limitations were caused by reasons other than pregnancy. 61
Young petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the case, and the Court granted
certiorari.
The Court recognized that the parties had very different interpretations of
the second clause of the PDA. 62 The plaintiff argued that whenever an employer
accommodates a subset of workers with disabling conditions, a PDA violation
exists if pregnant workers who are similar in their ability or inability to work do
not receive the same accommodation. 63 UPS argued that the second clause does
no more than “define sex discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination.” 64
The Court rejected both of these views. The Court said that Young’s
approach would grant pregnant women “most-favored-nation” status; as long as
an employer provides any employee with an accommodation (such as someone
who has been with the company for a long time or who works in a particularly
hazardous job), the employer would have to give pregnant workers the same
accommodation. 65 The Court did not believe that Young’s approach was
consistent with Congress’s intent when passing the PDA. 66 The second clause
of the PDA uses the open-ended term “other persons”; it does not say that the
employer must treat pregnant employees the same as “any other persons.” 67 The
Court also disagreed with UPS’s interpretation that the second clause simply
defines sex discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination. 68 The Court
noted that the first clause accomplished this objective when it expressly
amended Title VII to define “because of sex” to include because of pregnancy. 69
Moreover, UPS’s interpretation would fail to carry out Congress’s clear intent
59. Id. at 211–12. One of the reasons that a driver might lose DOT certification is if they were
convicted for drunk driving. See id. at 217. In other words, drunk drivers were accommodated but
pregnant women were not.
60. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. DKC 08–2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *17, *22 (D.
Md. Feb. 14, 2011).
61. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 450 (4th Cir. 2013).
62. Young, 575 U.S. at 219.
63. Id. at 220.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 221.
66. Id.
67. Young, 575 U.S. at 222.
68. Id. at 226.
69. Id.
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to overturn both the holding and reasoning of the Gilbert decision. 70 Simply
including pregnancy among Title VII’s protected traits would not respond to the
Gilbert Court’s determination that an employer can treat pregnancy less
favorably than diseases or disabilities resulting in a similar inability to work.71
The second clause was intended to do more than simply overturn Gilbert’s
reasoning that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination. It was also
intended to overrule the holding in Gilbert and illustrate how discrimination
against pregnancy is to be remedied. 72
Accordingly, the Court started with the McDonnell Douglas framework,
which is how most disparate treatment cases are analyzed. 73 The Court noted
that the first step in the analysis, the plaintiff’s prima facie case, is not intended
to be an onerous burden, and it should not require the plaintiff to show that those
whom the employer favored and disfavored were similar in all but the protected
ways. 74 Thus the plaintiff alleging that a denial of an accommodation constituted
disparate treatment under the PDA’s second clause may demonstrate a prima
facie case by showing that: (1) she belongs to the protected class; (2) she sought
accommodation; (3) the employer did not accommodate her; and (4) the
employer did accommodate others “similar in their ability or inability to
work.” 75 The burden would then shift to the employer to justify its refusal to
accommodate the plaintiff by relying on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons
for denying her the accommodation. 76 But (and this is key), the reason “normally
cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to
add pregnant women to the category of those (‘similar in their ability or inability
to work’) whom the employer accommodates. After all, the employer in Gilbert
could . . . have made such a claim.” 77 It is not entirely clear what reasons the
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Young, 575 U.S. at 228.
73. Id. at 210–13. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) is a famous Title
VII race discrimination case that set out the burden-shifting framework for intentional
discrimination cases under Title VII. The plaintiff claimed a discriminatory failure to hire. The
Court stated that the plaintiff first bears the burden of proof to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, which includes four elements: (1) that he belongs to a protected class; (2) that he
applied for and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) that after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of the plaintiff’s qualifications.
Id. at 802. Because most cases are not failure-to-hire cases, courts have modified the prima facie
case accordingly. Assuming the plaintiff can meet the prima facie case, the employer then has the
burden to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the decision. Assuming that burden
is met, the plaintiff has the opportunity to prove that the employer’s articulated reasons were not
the real reasons for the decision but were instead a pretext for discrimination. Id.
74. Young, 575 U.S. at 228.
75. Id. at 229.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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Court thought would suffice for this stage of the analysis, but some
commentators have argued that the Court suggested that permissible reasons
might include things like age, seniority, job classifications, or job
requirements. 78
The burden then shifts to the employee to show that the employer’s proffered
reasons are in fact pretextual. 79 And this is where the Court’s decision gets a
little strange. The Court stated:
We believe that the plaintiff may reach a jury on this issue by providing
sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on
pregnant workers, and that the employer’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory”
reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather—when
considered along with the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of
intentional discrimination. 80

As to the “significant burden” the Court mentioned, the Court stated that the
plaintiff can create a genuine issue of material fact by “providing evidence that
the employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while
failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers.” 81 Using the
facts of the instant case, the Court suggested that the plaintiff could show that
UPS accommodated most nonpregnant employees with lifting limitations while
categorically refusing to accommodate most pregnant employees with lifting
limitations. 82 She might also point to the fact that UPS had multiple policies that
accommodate nonpregnant employees with lifting restrictions and that this
suggests that “its reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees with
lifting restrictions are not sufficiently strong—to the point that a jury could find
that its reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees give rise to an
inference of intentional discrimination.” 83
Accordingly, the Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment, stating that
“there is a genuine dispute as to whether UPS provided more favorable treatment
to at least some employees whose situation cannot reasonably be distinguished
from Young’s.” 84 This provided the proof needed for the fourth element of the
prima facie case. 85 Young also introduced evidence that UPS had three separate
accommodation policies that, taken together, significantly burdened pregnant
women. 86 The Fourth Circuit did not consider the combined effects of these

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Zehrt, supra note 24, at 702.
Young, 575 U.S. at 229.
Id.
Id. at 229–30.
Id. at 230.
Id.
Young, 575 U.S. at 231.
Id.
Id.
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policies, nor did it consider the strength of UPS’s justifications for its policies. 87
As the Court stated, “[W]hy, when the employer accommodated so many, could
it not accommodate pregnant women as well?” 88
Scholars had mixed reactions to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Young.
Most commentators agreed that the Court’s decision deviated from normal
disparate treatment law, especially at the pretext stage. 89 But almost all scholars
recognized that the case was a positive step in the right direction for
accommodating pregnant women. 90 At the same time, many hoped that the
Court would have gone further and held that the PDA required accommodations
for pregnancy as long as any other employee had been accommodated or would
be accommodated if they were similar in their ability or inability to work.91
III. WHERE WE ARE
This Part will first discuss the ADA cases where pregnant plaintiffs sought
accommodations. It will then discuss the cases brought under the PDA since the
decision in Young. Because the ADA was amended in 2008, effective January
1, 2009, the ADA cases go back to the effective date of the ADAAA, whereas
the PDA cases are limited to the period after Young v. UPS was decided in 2015.
A.

ADA Pregnancy Accommodation Cases

As mentioned above, prior to the ADAAA, bringing an ADA claim based
on pregnancy was very difficult. The definition of disability was interpreted very
narrowly, and pregnancy was seen as a natural function of women’s bodies that,
at most, had only short-term effects on women’s ability to go about their daily
activities. However, the ADAAA’s expanded definition has allowed for more
pregnant women to claim a covered disability. In the cases I discovered where
87. Id.
88. Id. Ultimately the court remanded to the Fourth Circuit to determine whether Young
created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether UPS’s reasons for treating Young less
favorably than other nonpregnant employees were pretextual. Young, 575 U.S. at 232.
89. See, e.g., Shifting Sands, supra note 27, at 584–85; Widiss, supra note 25, at 1433
(describing the opinion as “unusual”); Zehrt, supra note 24, at 687 (stating that the case “further
complicates pregnancy accommodation decisions, leaving many unanswered questions for lower
federal courts to resolve in future cases.”).
90. See, e.g., Shifting Sands, supra note 27, at 590; Widiss, supra note 25, at 1433 (agreeing
with the decision and stating it makes “practical sense”).
91. See, e.g., Areheart, supra note 52, at 1138 (“[T]he holding is still a far cry from what
Young and most amici sought: a guaranteed right to pregnancy accommodations. Unless Congress
now chooses to amend the PDA, it appears the Supreme Court has closed the door on the statute’s
possible guarantee of accommodation rights.”); Widiss, supra note 25, at 1425–26 (stating that the
Court in Young stopped short of endorsing the argument that intent was irrelevant as long as the
plaintiff could show other workers received more favorable treatment); Zehrt, supra note 24, at 705
(stating that the Young decision leaves many open questions and Congress should intervene and
amend the PDA to provide pregnant workers a clear, affirmative right of accommodation).
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the alleged disability was pregnancy, courts allowed the plaintiff’s ADA claim
to survive in seventeen of them and dismissed the plaintiff’s ADA claim (on the
coverage question) in seven of them.
1. Pregnancy Is a Disability
As discussed earlier, the definition of disability is a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. Plaintiffs prove a
covered disability by establishing that (1) they have an impairment; (2) the
impairment affects a major life activity; and (3) the impairment substantially
limits the major life activity. The cases that discuss pregnancy as a disability
address one or more of these three steps to proving disability.
a. Pregnancy as an Impairment
The EEOC used to have a so-called pregnancy exclusion, stating that
pregnancy is ordinarily not an impairment. 92 Although that language still exists,
the regulations also state: “[A] pregnancy-related impairment that substantially
limits a major life activity is a disability under the first prong of the definition.”93
Some post-ADAAA courts are willing to recognize pregnancy as an impairment
as long as there are complications arising from or restrictions because of the
pregnancy. Thus, for instance, in Mayorga v. Alorica, Inc., 94 the plaintiff was a
customer service representative who had a high-risk pregnancy. 95 Her
complications included premature contractions; irritation of the uterus; severe
pelvic, back, and lower abdominal pain; headaches; and other pregnancy-related
conditions. 96 At one point she was put on bed rest for three weeks. 97 Upon
returning from three weeks of leave, she was terminated, with one of her
supervisors stating: “Sorry. I cannot accommodate you. This is a company. We
need you here. So, since you can’t be here because you are pregnant, we cannot
accommodate you.” 98 She brought both an ADA claim and a PDA claim, but the
employer only moved to dismiss the ADA claim. The court held that the ADA
claim survived the employer’s motion to dismiss. 99 The court noted that
pregnancy-related impairments can constitute a disability if they substantially

92. Fact Sheet for Small Businesses: Pregnancy Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (June 14, 2014), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/fact-sheet-smallbusinesses-pregnancy-discrimination.
93. 34 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (2019).
94. No. 12–21578–CIV., 2012 WL 3043021 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2012).
95. Id. at *1.
96. Id.
97. Id. Although her employer initially denied her leave request stating, “I am not going to
treat you special because you are pregnant,” subsequently, her leave was approved. Id.
98. Mayorga, 2012 WL 3043021, at *1.
99. Id. at *2–3.
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limit a major life activity. 100 “Thus, where a medical condition arises out of a
pregnancy and causes an impairment separate from the symptoms associated
with a healthy pregnancy, or significantly intensifies the symptoms associated
with a healthy pregnancy, such medical condition may fall within the ADA’s
definition of a disability.” 101 Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff had
pleaded sufficient facts to survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss. 102
Similarly, in Colas v. City of University of New York, 103 the court noted that
the plaintiff’s pregnancy-related symptoms, which included “periodic leg
muscle spasms, neck pain, fatigue and shortness of breath, episodes of cramping
and contractions, ligament pain, back pain, [ ] joint pain, nausea and
headaches,” 104 could be considered a disability. 105
b. Major Life Activities
One of the primary reasons that pregnant plaintiffs are able to establish
disabilities more readily after the ADAAA is because the Amendments
specifically include “lifting” as a major life activity, and many pregnant women
are on doctors’ orders to avoid heavy lifting. For instance, in Heatherly v.
Portillo’s Hot Dogs, Inc., 106 the plaintiff’s pregnancy was high risk so her doctor
ordered her to avoid working more than six to eight hours per day and to avoid
heavy lifting. 107 Although the court did not discuss the hour restriction, it did
hold that her restriction on lifting was enough to establish that her pregnancy
could be considered a disability. 108
Similarly, in Bray v. Town of Wake Forest, 109 the plaintiff was a police
officer who was still a probationary employee when she discovered that she was
pregnant. 110 She submitted a doctor’s note requesting that she be placed on light
duty. 111 The employer refused because it reserved light duty for those who
suffered from workplace injuries and terminated the plaintiff. 112 The plaintiff’s
complaint alleged that she was substantially limited in lifting, bending, running,

100. Id. at *4.
101. Id. at *5.
102. Id. at *6.
103. 17-CV-4825 (NGG) (JO), 2019 WL 2028701 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2019).
104. Id. at *1.
105. Id. at *3 (stating that pregnancy related impairments may qualify as ADA disabilities if
they substantially limit a major life activity).
106. 958 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
107. Id. at 920.
108. Id. at 921. Note, however, that her accommodation claim was denied because the court
held that the employer did in fact accommodate her. Id. at 922.
109. No. 5:14–CV–276–FL., 2015 WL 1534515 (E.D. N.C. Apr. 6, 2015).
110. Id. at *1.
111. Id. at *2.
112. Id. at *3.
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and jumping. 113 Citing to all the correct post-ADAAA law, 114 the court noted
that the plaintiff had three doctors’ notes stating that she could not lift more than
twenty pounds, run, jump or have physical altercations; this was sufficient to
establish that she had a disability. 115
A similar fact scenario was present in Colas v. City of University of New
York. 116 There the court held that there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate
that the plaintiff’s pregnancy-related complications substantially limited her in
bending and lifting. 117 And in Varone v. Great Wolf Lodge of the Poconos,
LLC, 118 the plaintiff worked as a massage therapist when she became pregnant.
Her doctor requested that she have ten-minute breaks in between the
massages. 119 The defendant failed to accommodate her, which led to her lawsuit.
In response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court noted that the plaintiff
had alleged that she could not stand for long periods of time and that her
pregnancy caused pain and cramping in her legs and stomach. 120 She argued she
was limited in the major life activity of lifting (along with other major life
activities). 121 The court held that she had pleaded enough to survive the
employer’s motion to dismiss. 122
Besides lifting, other major life activities claimed by pregnant plaintiffs can
survive dismissal. For instance, in Nayak v. St. Vincent Hospital & Health Care
Center, Inc., 123 the plaintiff successfully claimed the major life activity of
working. 124 And in Price v. UTI, U.S., Inc., 125 the plaintiff successfully pointed
to limitations of her reproductive system to survive a motion to dismiss her ADA
accommodation claim. 126 In an education setting (rather than employment), a
pregnant plaintiff successfully claimed that her pregnancy substantially limited
her ability to learn and attend school. 127 In Oliver v. Scranton Materials, Inc., 128

113. Id. at *9.
114. Bray, 2015 WL 1534515, at *9.
115. Id. at *11.
116. 17-CV-4825 (NGG) (JO), 2019 WL 2028701 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2019).
117. Id. at *4. See also LaSalle v. City of New York, No. 13 Civ. 5109(PAC), 2015 WL
1442376, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2015) (25-pound lifting restriction was enough for the plaintiff
to survive a motion to dismiss on her disability discrimination claim when the employer refused to
accommodate her lifting restriction).
118. No. 3:15-CV-304, 2016 WL 1393393 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2016).
119. Id. at *2.
120. Id. at *3.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. No. 1:12–cv–0817–RLY–MJD, 2013 WL 121838 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013).
124. Id. at *2–3.
125. No. 4:11–CV–1428 CAS, 2013 WL 798014 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2013).
126. Id. at *3.
127. Khan v. Midwestern University, 147 F. Supp. 3d 718, 722 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
128. 3:14-CV-00549, 2016 WL 3397679 (M.D. Pa. June 13, 2016).
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the plaintiff successfully claimed that the complications resulting from her
pregnancy substantially limited her in sleeping and eating (she was on a liquidonly diet). 129
c. Substantially Limits: Short-Term Issue
One of the reasons pregnancy was denied protection prior to the ADAAA
was because of the Supreme Court’s requirement that only impairments that
were permanent or long-term were protected. 130 But after the ADAAA,
impairments that are short-term can still constitute disabilities if they are
sufficiently severe. For instance, in Heatherly, discussed above, the employer
tried to argue that the short-term nature of the plaintiff’s pregnancy restrictions
precluded her pregnancy from being a disability. 131 But the court disagreed,
pointing to the regulations implementing the ADAAA, which state that an
impairment that is short-term can still be substantially limiting. 132
Similarly, in Nayak, 133 the court stated that a short-term impairment can be
substantially limiting. 134 Likewise, in Price v. UTI, U.S., Inc., 135 the plaintiff’s
accommodation claim under the ADA survived, with the court holding that there
was evidence that she was disabled given her multiple physiological disorders
and conditions that affected her reproductive system, and that conditions no
longer need to be long-term to be substantially limiting. 136 And in Mayorga,
discussed above, even though the plaintiff’s complications were only three
weeks long, they were severe enough that the short-term nature did not preclude
the plaintiff from surviving a motion to dismiss. 137

129. Id. at *11 n.12.
130. Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002).
131. Heatherly v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
132. Id. Relying on this case, another court held in an education, not employment, case that the
short-term nature of the plaintiff’s pregnancy does not preclude it from being considered a
disability. See Khan, 147 F.Supp.3d at 722–23.
133. Nayak v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., No. 1:12–cv–0817–RLY–MJD, 2013 WL
121838 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013).
134. Id. at *3 (noting that complications that lasted most of her pregnancy and beyond were
sufficient to establish a disability under the ADAAA). Interestingly, the court contrasted this case’s
facts with another case, Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2011), stating
that the pregnancy complications were longer-lasting in the case at hand, Nayak, 2013 WL 121838,
at *3, but Serednyj is not a post-ADAAA case. Despite the fact that it was decided in 2011, the
facts of the case (the pregnancy and termination) took place in 2007. Serednyj, 656 F.3d at 547.
The ADAAA is not retroactive so courts only apply the expanded definition of disability when the
facts of the case occurred after January 1, 2009, the effective date of the ADAAA. See ADA
Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 3406 (2008).
135. No. 4:11–CV–1428 CAS, 2013 WL 798014 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2013).
136. Id. at *3.
137. Mayorga v. Alorica, Inc., No. 12–21578–CIV., 2012 WL 3043021, at *1, *6 (S.D. Fla.
July 25, 2012). See also Oliver v. Scranton Materials, Inc., 3:14-CV-00549, 2016 WL 3397679, at
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d. Disability Conceded
In some cases, the defendant concedes the disability issue or the court just
assumes that pregnancy is a disability. 138 For instance, in Alexander v. Trilogy
Health Services, LLC, 139 the plaintiff was instructed not to work because of her
high blood pressure after she learned she was pregnant in May 2010. 140 The
dispute in this case was whether the employer failed to provide her a leave of
absence in order for her to stabilize her pregnancy-related high blood
pressure. 141 The defendant simply conceded that the plaintiff was disabled,
although the plaintiff claimed hypertension as the impairment, rather than the
pregnancy per se. 142 The court held that the plaintiff was subject to suspension
and termination when the defendant denied her a reasonable accommodation for
her preeclampsia in violation of the ADA. 143
Similarly, in EEOC v. Absolut Facilities Management, LLC, 144 the EEOC
brought a class claim against the employer, alleging that the employer refused
to offer any accommodations to pregnant women or individuals with disabilities,
basically refusing to let anyone work with restrictions. 145 The initial claim
involved a pregnant woman who had a twenty pound lifting restriction and was
forced by the employer to take leave instead of having her lifting restriction
accommodated. 146 The court approved a consent decree, issuing a permanent
injunction against the employer’s failure to accommodate and also awarding
back pay, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. 147
In Everett v. Grady Memorial Hospital Corp., 148 the plaintiff worked as a
program manager for a car seat safety program at the hospital. Her job involved
a great deal of standing, walking, bending, and occasional heavy lifting. 149 When
*11 (M.D. Pa. June 13, 2016) (noting that the short-term nature of pregnancy no longer matters in
determining whether someone is disabled under the ADA).
138. See, e.g., Townsend v. Town of Brusly, 421 F. Supp. 3d at 355, 367 (M.D. La. Nov. 8,
2019) (assuming that the plaintiff, who was a police officer when she became pregnant and required
light duty work, was disabled under the ADA).
139. No. 1:11–cv–295, 2012 WL 5268701 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2012).
140. Id. at *2–3.
141. Id. at *11–12.
142. Id. at *11.
143. Id. at *12.
144. No. 1:18-CV-01020 EAW, 2018 WL 5258057 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018).
145. Id. at *1–2.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *3. See also EEOC v. Tricore Reference Lab’ys, 849 F.3d 929, 938 (10th Cir. 2017)
(in this discovery dispute, the defendant appeared to concede and the court assumed that the
plaintiff’s restrictions because of her pregnancy constituted a disability; the question was whether
the employer denied her an accommodation when it did not allow her to automatically transfer into
a vacant position).
148. 703 F. App’x 938 (11th Cir. 2017).
149. Id. at 940–41.
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she became pregnant, her pregnancy was high risk. 150 Eventually, her doctor put
her on bed rest and she requested to work from home, which the employer
refused. 151 The employer in this case conceded that she was disabled by her
pregnancy and the only issue was whether a work-from-home accommodation
would allow her to perform the functions of her job. 152
2. Pregnancy Is Not a Disability
Some of the cases in which plaintiffs could not establish that their
pregnancies were a disability appear to be the result of either poor lawyering
(although one of the plaintiffs was pro se) or the court’s failure to recognize the
broad post-ADAAA standards. A third reason some plaintiffs could not
successfully pursue a claim under the ADA is because their restrictions (leading
to their requested accommodations) were preemptive, rather than related to any
complications caused by their pregnancies. This sub-part will address each of
these three reasons in turn.
a. Poor Lawyering
In one example of what I believe was poor lawyering, the plaintiff’s
pregnancy caused her doctor to restrict her lifting to no more than ten pounds. 153
The employer refused to accommodate her lifting restrictions. 154 Because she
ended up going on leave for the last five months of her pregnancy, the employer
terminated her because she exceeded the twelve weeks of leave allowed under
the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). 155 Although the court recognized that
pregnancy can sometimes be a disability, and that the plaintiff should have easily
been able to demonstrate that she was substantially limited in the major life
activity of lifting, 156 the plaintiff argued that she was substantially limited in her
ability to reproduce and carry her pregnancy to term. 157 The court held she was
not disabled. 158

150. Id. at 940.
151. Id. at 941, 944.
152. Id. at 942. See also Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 883 F.3d 595,
600, 603 (6th Cir. 2018) (defendant conceded that the pregnant plaintiff, who was an in-house
attorney, was disabled when she was put on bed rest and requested to work from home).
153. Scheidt v. Floor Covering Assocs., Inc., No. 16-cv-5999, 2018 WL 4679582, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 28, 2018).
154. Id.
155. Id. at *2–3. The facts appear quite egregious. They approved her to be on leave longer
than the twelve weeks but then terminated her for exceeding it. Id.
156. See cases cited supra Part III.A.1.b.
157. Scheidt, 2018 WL 4679582, at *6.
158. Id. at *7.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2020]

ACCOMMODATING PREGNANCY FIVE YEARS AFTER YOUNG V. UPS

91

In Sam-Sekur v. Whitemore Group, Ltd., 159 the plaintiff proceeded pro se. 160
Most of her medical issues occurred after she had returned from maternity
leave. 161 Her medical problems included a breast cancer scare, appendectomy,
infection from an intrauterine device, an infected oral implant, 162 some of which
caused swelling, fevers, and something called “chronic cholecystitis.” 163 The
court held that all but the last of these conditions were too short-term to be
substantially limiting. 164 Fortunately, with respect to the chronic cholecystitis,
the court gave the plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to explain how this
condition was linked to her pregnancy. 165
In Love v. First Transit, Inc., 166 the plaintiff was a customer service
representative who began bleeding while she was pregnant and subsequently
miscarried. 167 She was terminated because she did not present a doctor’s note
after she miscarried. 168 The court noted that the ADAAA has had only a modest
impact when applied to pregnancy-related conditions. 169 Pregnancy itself is not
a disability even though pregnancy-related work restrictions might be a
disability—conditions such as anemia, sciatica, carpal tunnel syndrome,
gestational diabetes, depression, etc. 170 The court stated: “Thus, where a medical
condition arises out of a pregnancy and causes an impairment separate from the
symptoms associated with a healthy pregnancy, or significantly intensifies the
symptoms associated with a healthy pregnancy, such medical condition may fall
within the ADA’s definition of a disability.” 171 The plaintiff in this case tried to
argue that her pregnancy substantially limited the major life activities of
working, concentrating, and interacting with others. 172 The court held that, given
that the plaintiff was only off work for one day, she could not successfully argue

159. No. 11–cv–4938 (JFB)(GRB), 2012 WL 2244325 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2012).
160. Id. at *1.
161. Id. at *2.
162. Id.
163. Id. at *6.
164. Sam-Sekur, 2012 WL 2244325, at *7. The court, however, cited to pre-ADAAA law
regarding the short-term issue. Thus, this case could also fall under the category of “Court Errors.”
165. Id. at *9. Chronic cholecystitis is defined as a repeated and prolonged inflammation of the
gallbladder. See Judi Marcin, Chronic Cholecystitis, HEALTHLINE (Oct. 23, 2017),
https://www.healthline.com/health/chronic-cholecystitis. There does appear to be an increased risk
of this condition with pregnant women, so perhaps the plaintiff would be able to successfully amend
her complaint. However, it is unclear to me why the court needed to link this condition to her
pregnancy rather than consider it a stand-alone disability.
166. No. 16-cv-2208, 2017 WL 1022191 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2017).
167. Id. at *1.
168. Id.
169. Id. at *5.
170. Id.
171. Love, 2017 WL 1022191, at *5.
172. Id. at *6.
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that any of her claimed major life activities were substantially limited. 173 I
consider this a case of poor lawyering because the plaintiff would have had
better luck arguing that her major bodily function of reproduction was
substantially limited. 174
b. Court Errors
One very frustrating case was Abbott v. Elwood Staffing Services, Inc., 175 in
which the pregnant plaintiff worked in a car manufacturing plant (through a
staffing agency), when she started spotting after she strained to do her job. 176
Because of the spotting, her doctor put her on restrictions. 177 In discussing the
issue of whether the plaintiff’s pregnancy could be considered a disability, the
court first noted that pregnancy, absent unusual circumstances, is not considered
a disability. 178 Although the court recognized that, under the ADAAA, a
pregnancy-related impairment may be considered a disability if it substantially
limits a major life activity, here, there was no evidence that the plaintiff’s
pregnancy was not healthy or had complications. 179 Even though the plaintiff
argued that she was put on restrictions after straining at work and bleeding, the
court stated that this does not mean there was anything wrong with her
pregnancy. 180 In an issue I am exploring elsewhere, the court also focused on
the fact that the plaintiff did not specifically state she was disabled during her
deposition. The court stated, “Finally, and tellingly in her deposition, the
plaintiff stated that her condition ‘wasn’t a disability, it was pregnancy and onthe-job injury, I wasn’t disabled. I was at all times physically able to work with
requirements and restrictions.’ She never considered herself disabled . . . .” 181
In Selkow v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 182 the plaintiff worked in a 7-Eleven store when
she became pregnant. She was supposed to scan the beer in the cooler but that
involved lifting a lot of heavy items. She tried performing the task but it began
hurting her back because of her pregnancy, so she asked a coworker to help, and
he did. 183 She told her supervisor that she needed help with heavy lifting and the
supervisor agreed; she was never asked to lift heavy objects again. 184 To be clear,
173. Id.
174. Williams, et al., supra note 13, at 116 (stating that any condition that, if left untreated,
would result in a miscarriage, should be a disability under the theory that it substantially limits the
major bodily function of reproduction).
175. 44 F. Supp. 3d 1125 (N.D. Ala. 2014).
176. Id. at 1159.
177. Id. at 1159.
178. Id. at 1165.
179. Id.
180. Abbott, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1138.
181. Id. at 1166.
182. No. 8:11–cv–456–T–33EAJ, 2012 WL 2054872 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2012).
183. Id. at *1.
184. Id.
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this was not a failure-to-accommodate claim. 185 However, she still claimed that
her termination was discriminatory based on her pregnancy, which she alleged
was a disability. 186 Although the court held that she could not rebut the
defendant’s legitimate reason for terminating her, namely an allegation that she
had engaged in theft, 187 the court nevertheless addressed the disability issue. 188
It held that her claim failed because her lifting restriction was not the result of a
“severe” complication with her pregnancy. 189 In doing so, however, the court
did not cite to any post-ADAAA law or discuss the fact that lifting should be
considered a major life activity. 190
c. Preemptive Accommodations
One of the difficulties with using the ADA for accommodations related to
pregnancy is if the accommodation requested is not needed for any
complications arising from the pregnancy, but rather is simply a preemptive
measure to avoid any harm to an otherwise healthy pregnancy. This usually
occurs in situations where the work is inherently dangerous. For instance, in
Brown v. Aria Health, 191 the pregnant plaintiff was a nurse and requested a
doctor’s note to exclude her from working in rooms where fluoroscopy (a type
of x-ray) was used. 192 Her supervisor said they would try to limit her contact but
noted that in the past, other pregnant nurses had worked in those areas without
issue. 193 The employer also gave her the option of stepping out of the room
and/or wearing a fetal monitoring badge, but the plaintiff did not accept any of
these options. 194 The plaintiff was also worried about areas of the hospital where
bone cement was being used and obtained a doctor’s note precluding her from
working in such areas. 195 The plaintiff resigned because the hospital could not
guarantee that it could comply with her restrictions. 196 The court held that the
plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim failed because her pregnancy was
routine, meaning it was without any complications. Her desire to avoid some
185. Id. Instead, she was terminated after there was a shortage in her cash register and the
surveillance tape looked like she had pocketed cash. Id. at *1–3.
186. Selkow, 2012 WL 2054872, at *3.
187. Id. at *10.
188. Id. at *11. Even though the court arguably reached the right result (because she cannot
establish that the employer’s reason for terminating her was pretextual), it is still troubling when
courts get the disability analysis wrong because later courts will rely on the faulty reasoning,
thereby perpetuating the court’s error.
189. Id. at *14.
190. Id.
191. No. 17-1827, 2019 WL 1745653 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2019).
192. Id. at *2.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Brown, 2019 WL 1745653, at *3.
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aspects of her job was not based on actual restrictions but rather an abundance
(perhaps over-abundance?) of caution. 197
B.

PDA Accommodation Claims Post-Young

This sub-part will discuss the cases decided post-Young v. UPS that
specifically address the pregnancy accommodation issue. There are obviously
other PDA cases that only address discrimination issues (and not
accommodation issues). 198 I have not included those in this discussion. This part
will first discuss the pregnancy accommodation cases that were successful
(thirteen of them) and then the ones that were not (eleven of them).
1. PDA Accommodation Claim Succeeds
One of the relatively early post-Young cases has already received much
attention. 199 In Legg v. Ulster County, 200 the plaintiff was a corrections officer
at a county jail when she became pregnant after earlier pregnancy-related
complications. 201 Because of those complications, her doctor classified her
pregnancy as high risk and recommended that she have no contact with inmates.
After the employer initially denied the request, another lieutenant agreed to
assign her to a light duty position if she was able to submit a note stating that
she was free to work without restrictions. 202 In order to avoid going on leave,
she produced that note and was able to work light duty for a period of time. 203
However, before long, she was back to working with inmates again, and, while
seven months pregnant, she was bumped as one of two fighting inmates ran past
her. 204 She left work and did not return until after she gave birth. 205
Her subsequent case went to trial, and the district court granted defendant’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of her case, holding that the
employer’s policy of only allowing light duty for on-the-job injuries was

197. Id. at *5. Interestingly, however, the plaintiff’s PDA claim succeeded. Id. at *7.
198. See, e.g., Oliver v. Scranton Materials, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-00549, 2016 WL 3397679, at
*2, *5 (M.D. Pa. June 13, 2016) (pregnancy discrimination claim survived in part because of
comments made about her pregnancy (she was pregnant with triplets), which included, “You’re not
going to be able to work with those three fucking babies at home.”); Mayer v. Prof’l Ambulance,
LLC, 211 F. Supp. 3d 408, 411, 415 (D.R.I. 2016) (plaintiff who was terminated for wanting to
pump breast milk after she returned from maternity leave had a valid PDA discrimination claim).
199. This is in part because it’s a Court of Appeals case (Second Circuit), whereas most of the
cases are still at the District Court level.
200. 820 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2016).
201. Id. at 70–71.
202. Id. at 71. It appears that the employer wanted to hide the fact that it was giving her light
duty, for whatever reason.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Legg, 820 F.3d at 71.
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pregnancy-neutral and therefore did not violate the PDA. 206 During the
pendency of the appeal, Young v. UPS was decided. 207 Accordingly, using the
prima facie case announced in Young, 208 the court stated that she proved the
prima facie case. 209 She sought an accommodation while pregnant; the employer
refused; and there were employees similar in their ability or inability to work
who did receive accommodations, namely those injured on the job. 210 For the
employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason, it argued that New York
Municipal law required them to pay corrections officers who are injured on the
job (if they are not able to work), so the employer creates and reserves light-duty
positions for those employees. The court held that this reason met the employer’s
burden. 211
As is true with most discrimination cases, the plaintiff’s case turned on the
issue of pretext with the court holding that the plaintiff had established sufficient
evidence of pretext. The court pointed to two primary pieces of evidence that
established pretext. First, the employer presented inconsistent justifications for
not providing the plaintiff with light duty. 212 One supervisor said that the
employer wanted everyone to build up sick time and did not “believe in light
duty” accommodations for those injured off the job. 213 Another supervisor said
that they refused her light duty in order to protect the safety of her unborn
child. 214 A third explanation was that it was more costly to provide light duty to
pregnant employees. 215 And finally, the employer claimed at the appellate stage
that the policy was justified because they were complying with state law.216
Second, the court held that the plaintiff could prove pretext using the
analysis under Young. 217 Similar to the Young case, the employer denied light
duty to all pregnant employees. 218 Although it was unclear whether the county
accommodated a large percentage of non-pregnant employees in practice, they
were at least eligible under the employer’s policy. 219 Although the employer
tried to argue that pregnant employees were not significantly burdened because
206. Id. at 71.
207. Id. at 72–73.
208. See supra Part II.C.
209. Legg, 820 F.3d at 74.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 74–75.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Legg, 820 F.3d at 75. This explanation makes no sense. Refusing her light duty but
continuing to let her work (and insisting that she have contact with inmates) undoubtedly put her
and her unborn child at more risk than if they had given her light duty work.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Legg, 820 F.3d at 76.
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the plaintiff was the only employee who had been pregnant, the court disagreed
with this analysis, stating, “[U]nder Young, the focus is on how many pregnant
employees were denied accommodations in relation to the total number of
pregnant employees, not how many were denied accommodations in relation to
all employees, pregnant or not.” 220 Thus, the court held that this fact
demonstrated the significant burden on the plaintiff. 221
The employer also tried to argue that the plaintiff did not need an
accommodation because she continued working after the employer promised her
light duty and then took it away. 222 The court responded that a policy that denies
pregnant employees light duty and places them at risk of violent confrontations
is a significant burden on pregnant employees under the Young analysis. 223 In
sum, the court held that the defendants’ reasons were not sufficiently strong to
justify the burden on pregnant workers. 224 And just because state law required
accommodating on-the-job injuries did not mean that state law precluded the
employer from providing those same accommodations to pregnant workers. 225
Finally, although the employer argued that cost was a factor in not providing
light duty to pregnant workers, the court responded that cost cannot be
considered under Young. 226
Although Legg is the only published appellate case, 227 there are other district
court cases where plaintiffs survived on the analysis under Young. 228 For
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Legg, 820 F.3d at 77.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. The one other appellate published case is Hicks v. City of Tuscaloosa, 870 F.3d 1253 (11th
Cir. 2017). This is an important case that held that lactation is a medical condition related to
pregnancy and therefore protected by the PDA, and that plaintiff’s PDA claim survived using the
analysis in Young. While the city was not required to provide Hicks with special accommodations
for her lactation needs (which involved not wanting to be a patrol officer because the ballistic vest
would interfere with lactation), because other employees were given alternative duties, she should
have been as well. Id. at 1258–60.
228. To be clear, the plaintiffs survived motions for summary judgment or motions to dismiss
in several other cases as well, but in the interest of space, I will only be discussing the cases with
the most significant discussions of the accommodation analysis post-Young. Other cases where the
plaintiff’s claim survived include: Allen-Brown v. District of Columbia, 174 F. Supp. 3d 463
(D.D.C. 2016) (involving a police officer who requested accommodation to avoid having to wear
a bullet-proof vest after her maternity leave because it interfered with her lactation; PDA
accommodation claim succeeded); Borders v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 17-cv-0506-MJR-DGW,
2018 WL 9645780, at *1–2, *6 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2018) (plaintiffs’ class action survived motion
to dismiss because employer accommodated workplace injuries and disabilities but not pregnancy);
Bray v. Town of Wake Forest, No. 5:14-CV-276-FL, 2015 WL 1534515, at *3, *6 (E.D. N.C. Apr.
6, 2015) (plaintiff police officer’s PDA claim survived because she was refused light duty while
two male officers received light duty and there is evidence to rebut the employer’s explanation that
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instance, in Thomas v. Florida Parishes Juvenile Justice Commission, 229 the
plaintiff worked as a juvenile detention staff officer, which put her in contact
with potentially violent detainees. 230 She informed her employer of her
pregnancy on April 1, 2016, and asked to have her bi-annual physical fitness test
moved so that she could complete it earlier in her pregnancy. 231 Her employer
allowed her to complete four components of the test on the same day as her
request, but said that the 1.5 mile run would take place as originally scheduled
on April 21, 2016. She failed the run, and, because she was feeling ill after the
run, she went to the emergency room where she was diagnosed with a placental
bleed. 232 She was on bed rest for two days and then told to be on light duty for
two weeks; however, the employer refused, so she had to take personal leave for
two weeks. 233 She returned to work without restrictions, but when her run was
rescheduled for June 6, her doctor wrote a note stating that she should avoid
running and heavy lifting due to her high-risk pregnancy. 234 In response to this
note, the employer told her that she had to do the run and should not turn in the
note. 235 The employer explained that it would not excuse pregnant women from
the 1.5 mile run even with a doctor’s note. 236 Apparently, however, there were
situations where it excused non-pregnant employees with physical limitations
from the run. 237 Relying on the advice of her boss, she attempted and failed the
they reserved light duty only for on-the-job injuries); Brown v. Aria Health, No. 17-1827, 2019
WL 1745653, at *7–8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2019) (allowing plaintiff’s PDA accommodation claim to
go forward based on her request to avoid certain aspects of her job as a nurse that her doctor
believed might pose a risk to her pregnancy; constructive discharge based on the employer’s failure
to accommodate her); EEOC v. Absolut Facilities Management, LLC, No. 1:18-CV-01020 EAW,
2018 WL 5258057, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018) (approving a consent decree issuing a
permanent injunction against the employer’s discrimination of pregnant women and individuals
with disabilities by refusing all accommodations); LaSalle v. City of New York, No. 13 Civ.
5109(PAC), 2015 WL 1442376 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2015) (allowing plaintiff’s PDA claim to
survive when her employer refused to accommodate her lifting restriction; although employer
argued that the accommodation requested would not allow her to perform the essential functions of
her job, the employer offered no explanation for why her requested accommodation was reasonable
when she was pregnant in 2008 and yet they refused it in 2012); Martin v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc.,
132 F. Supp. 3d 794, 802–03, 822 (M.D. La. 2015) (plaintiff’s PDA claim survived after she was
refused an accommodation to avoid lifting over ten pounds, forced on leave, and then terminated);
McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817, 820–21, 829–30 (Iowa 2015) (paramedic for fire
department was refused light duty while pregnant; state law claim relying on Young reversed
summary judgment granted to employer).
229. No. 18-2921, 2019 WL 118011 (E.D. La. Jan. 7, 2019).
230. Id. at *1.
231. Id. at *2.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Thomas, 2019 WL 118011, at *2.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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run on June 6, which led to severe pain and another trip to the emergency
room. 238 The doctor ordered light duty, which the employer initially refused and
only granted when the plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim. 239 The
plaintiff worked in a light duty position until she was ordered on bed rest; she
returned to work after the baby was born. 240
The plaintiff had brought claims under both the ADA and PDA but she only
opposed the employer’s motion for summary judgment on the PDA claim. 241
Even though she was eventually accommodated, her PDA claim alleged that the
employer violated the PDA for refusing to accommodate her pregnancy-related
restriction on running by forcing her to complete the run test. 242 The court first
noted that she had direct evidence of discrimination because her supervisor said
that the employer did not allow pregnant employees to be excused from the 1.5mile run, but it had allowed other employees to be excused from the run. 243 The
court also upheld her claim using the Young analysis. 244 The employer tried to
argue that she did not suffer an adverse employment action because she was not
terminated or forced on leave. 245 In response, the plaintiff argued that her
injuries from having to perform the 1.5-mile run constituted an adverse
employment action, as was the fact that her workers’ compensation claim
resulted in a reduction in pay. 246 But the court (correctly, in my opinion) held
that an adverse employment action is not an element of the prima facie case
when bringing a claim under the PDA for a failure to accommodate. 247 This issue
of whether an adverse employment action is a necessary element in a failure-toaccommodate case has also arisen under the ADA, 248 so I was happy to see the
court in this case address it and come to the correct conclusion that an adverse
employment action is not a necessary element of a failure-to-accommodate
claim under the PDA.
Another issue that is being debated by the courts post-Young is how similar
the comparator must be under the fourth element of the prima facie case. This
issue was addressed in Townsend v. Town of Brusly, 249 in which the plaintiff was
a police officer when she became pregnant in 2015. 250 Her doctor advised light
238. Id. at *3.
239. Thomas, 2019 WL 118011, at *3.
240. Id.
241. Id. at *4.
242. Id. at *5.
243. Id. at *6.
244. Thomas, 2019 WL 118011, at *7.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at *8.
248. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Adverse Employment Actions in Failure-to-Accommodate
Cases: Much Ado About Nothing, 95 NYU L. REV. (ONLINE) 1, 5 (2020).
249. 421 F. Supp. 3d 352, 363 (M.D. La. 2019).
250. Id. at 355.
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duty work for her, but the employer refused. 251 She obtained a lawyer to help
her navigate the negotiations for an accommodation with the employer. 252
During one of the meetings with the plaintiff, her lawyer, and the employer’s
representatives, the Mayor stated that if the plaintiff wanted to keep her job, she
should not remain pregnant. 253 Towards the end of her pregnancy, the plaintiff
was able to return to work full duty, and in a meeting between the plaintiff and
the employer to discuss her return, the employer’s attorney advised the plaintiff
that if she dropped her EEOC charge and lawsuit, they would consider
reinstating her to her prior position. 254 The Plaintiff declined to do so and was
fired on the spot. 255 Another complication for the plaintiff in this case was that
a certification the plaintiff needed to perform her job as a police officer lapsed
while she was pregnant. 256 The employer tried to justify its termination of her
by arguing that she was no longer qualified. 257
After a lengthy discussion of the facts and holding of Young, 258 the court
first found that there was direct evidence of discrimination—the employer’s
statement that she should not stay pregnant if she wanted to keep her job, and
the fact that the Chief of Police admitted that the employer never considered
placing the plaintiff on light duty. 259 The court then addressed the prima facie
case under Young. The employer tried to argue that the plaintiff was not qualified
because she could not carry a firearm due to her pregnancy, but the court stated
that the qualified inquiry is not an element of a PDA claim post-Young. 260
Regarding the issue of a comparator (the fourth element of the prima facie
case under Young), the employer focused on the different professional
experience of the plaintiff’s chosen comparator, who was given light duty
following eye surgeries. 261 The court responded that determining a PDA
comparator should not include an analysis of the difference in professional
experience, disciplinary record, or available leave time. 262 Instead, the sole basis
for comparison is the similarity in the physical restrictions of the employees and
the need for similar accommodations. 263 Thus, both of the comparators that

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 356.
Id.
Id.
Townsend, 421 F. Supp. 3d at 356.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 358–59.
Townsend, 421 F. Supp. 3d at 360.
Id. at 362–63. This is a debated issue, as will be discussed in Part IV.
Id. at 363.
Id.
Id.
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plaintiff pointed to were valid comparators to meet the fourth element of the
prima facie case. 264
The court assumed without discussion that the employer’s alleged legitimate
non-discriminatory reasons were sufficient to meet its burden. 265 These reasons
included: (1) that the plaintiff was no longer qualified because of her restrictions
and the fact that her certification had lapsed, and (2) that her position had been
filled while she was on leave. 266 Turning to pretext, the court first relied on the
fact that the Chief of Police resented the plaintiff’s assertion of her legal rights
and had stated that the defendant never even considered giving the plaintiff light
duty work. 267 In response to the defendant’s argument that state law does not
require the employer to provide light duty to pregnant workers (as it does to
workers injured on the job), the court stated that reliance on state law can still
be pretextual if the reason for not also giving the pregnant employee the
accommodation is because of cost concerns. 268 As the Court noted in Young, the
fact that accommodating pregnant workers would cost more is not a sufficient
reason for refusing to do so. 269 The court stated:
The same could be said in the present case, particularly considering the complete
failure to even consider accommodating Plaintiff while others with physical
restrictions were accommodated, and in light of the comments made to Plaintiff
that were hostile to her pregnancy or demonstrated a blanket refusal to
accommodate her pregnancy. Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s PDA claim. 270

2. PDA Accommodation Claim Fails
Of the eleven cases I identified where the PDA accommodation claim failed
post-Young, several of them involved courts incorrectly applying the framework
the Court announced in Young. Other claims that failed did so because the
employer’s relatively small size meant that there were not any comparators. And
some failed simply because of bad facts. 271

264. Townsend, 421 F. Supp. 3d at 364.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 365.
269. Townsend, 421 F. Supp. 3d at 365.
270. Id. at 366.
271. See, e.g., Jones v. Brennan, No. 16–CV–0049–CVE–FHM, 2017 WL 5586373, at *6
(N.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2017) (plaintiff loses her PDA accommodation claim because she actually
was accommodated); Everett v. Grady Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 703 F. App’x 938, 948–49 (11th Cir.
2017) (accommodation claim failed because accommodation requested of working from home was
not reasonable).
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a. Court Errors
Courts appear to be struggling with how to apply the Supreme Court’s odd
framework announced in Young. For instance, in Adduci v. Federal Express
Corp., 272 the plaintiff’s job required her to be able to lift seventy-five pounds
unassisted. 273 When she informed her supervisor that she was pregnant and was
on a twenty-five pound lifting restriction, the employer told her that she could
not keep working, and that she was not eligible for “TRW (temporary return to
work)” because she was a part-time employee. 274 Therefore, she was put on
unpaid leave. 275 While on leave and still pregnant, they demanded she return
with no restrictions, and when she could not, the employer terminated her. 276
The court analyzed the plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim 277 using the
McDonnell Douglas framework normally used for disparate treatment cases,
rather than the prima facie case announced in Young for pregnancy
accommodation cases. 278 Thus, the court was applying the stricter comparator
test, where the comparator must be similarly situated in all relevant respects. 279
Moreover, when the plaintiff pointed to the policy allowing part-time workers
with a workplace injury to apply for light duty assignment, the court responded
that the relevant inquiry is whether there actually was another employee who
received more favorable benefits, not simply whether some hypothetical
employee would be given more favorable benefits under the employer’s
policy. 280 This analysis makes it very difficult for pregnant plaintiffs to prove
their cases. In other words, for this particular employer, the policy’s terms
allowed full-time and part-time employees with workplace injuries to apply for
light duty. It also allowed full-time employees with a non-workplace injury to
apply for light duty. The only group that was excluded was part-time employees
with a non-workplace injury. It seems likely that most such workers (part-time
employees with a non-workplace injury) are going to be pregnant women, and
yet the court never analyzed this plaintiff’s claim under the unique burdenshifting framework announced in Young.

272. 298 F. Supp. 3d 1153 (W.D. Tenn. 2018).
273. Id. at 1155. Note that this is a very similar factual context to Young v. UPS.
274. Id. at 1156.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1157.
277. She also brought a disparate impact claim. Adduci, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1159. Perhaps
surprisingly, this claim survived. Id. at 1165.
278. Id. at 1159–60.
279. Id. at 1162.
280. Id. at 1163.
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Similarly, in Chino v. Lifespace Communities, Inc., 281 a nursing assistant
had a twenty-five pound lifting restriction, but the employer had a policy that
every nursing assistant would be immediately removed if they had a lifting
restriction. 282 However, if the employee was injured on the job, the employer
would try to place the employee on light duty where possible or practicable.283
Otherwise, the employee would be terminated. 284 Accordingly, when the
plaintiff told her employer that she was pregnant, the supervisor responded:
“You know what’s going to happen now . . . You’re going to have to take your
12 weeks, then you’ll have your baby, we’ll terminate you, you’ll come back,
re-apply and we’ll hire you back.” The plaintiff was also told that the employer
doesn’t “make accommodations” and “you do the job that you’re hired for or
you don’t work.” 285
The court cited to Young but arguably misinterpreted it. First, the court
assumed without deciding that the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case,
but then stated that the plaintiff’s “claim fails because she cannot establish that
[the employer’s] proffered reason for denying her light duty is a mere pretext for
discrimination.” 286 After discussing and dismissing plaintiff’s pretext arguments
not related to the analysis in Young, the court then turned to a discussion of
Young. 287 The court stated the Young Court took no position on whether the
policies in Young actually met the pretext standard, “a holding that suggests,
without more, the existence of facially neutral policies that offer some workers
better treatment than others does not establish discrimination . . . .” 288 The court
also stated that, because the plaintiff had not pointed to anything “outside of her
own experience,” she had not proven that the employer’s policy imposed a
significant burden on pregnant workers. 289 The court appeared to be arguing
that, because the plaintiff did not specifically point to other pregnant workers
who were affected by the policy, the burden on pregnant women was not very
great. However, given that nursing assistants are overwhelmingly women, 290 it
seems highly likely that other nursing assistants have been or would become
pregnant and therefore would be affected by the employer’s policy.
281. 203 F. Supp. 3d 997 (D. Minn. 2016). This case was brought under a state statute, but one
which is modeled after and appears to follow federal law for pregnancy discrimination claims. Id.
at 1003.
282. Id. at 1000.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1001.
285. Chino, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 1001.
286. Id. at 1005.
287. Id. at 1005–06.
288. Id. at 1006–07.
289. Id. at 1007.
290. Campbell Robertson & Robert Gebeloff, How Millions of Women Became the Most
Essential Workers in America, INT’L N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020
/04/18/us/coronavirus-women-essential-workers.html.
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In a case that received some attention, 291 Durham v. Rural/Metro Corp., 292
the plaintiff, an EMT, told her employer that her doctor restricted her from lifting
more than fifty pounds. 293 Her boss told her that she would not be able to work
as an EMT with the lifting restriction. 294 She requested either light duty or a
dispatch position. 295 The employer refused both requests because its light duty
policy only applied to employees who had a workplace injury, and they did not
have a need for any more dispatch employees. 296 Because she was not eligible
for leave under the FMLA, the employer advised the plaintiff to apply for unpaid
personal leave, but told her that if she did so, she would not be allowed to seek
unemployment compensation, or to try to find another job. 297 Accordingly, she
declined to apply for such leave and then filed a charge with the EEOC and the
instant lawsuit. 298
Although the court cited to Young, it did not utilize the prima facie case
method used in Young; instead, it cited to the ordinary McDonnell Douglas
framework, which does not mention accommodation at all. 299 As the reader
likely knows, the modified McDonnell Douglas framework generally requires
the plaintiff to prove: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was
qualified to do the job; (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action;
and (4) similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated
differently. 300 Interestingly, the court cited to Young301 when it listed the
elements of the prima facie case, but ignored the fact that, nine pages later, the
Supreme Court in Young announced a different prima facie case that should be
used when the plaintiff is alleging a denial of an accommodation under the
second clause of the PDA. 302 As discussed above, the prima facie case in
pregnancy accommodation cases requires: “that she belongs to the protected
class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate
her, and that the employer did accommodate others ‘similar in their ability or
inability to work.’” 303
291. See Robert Iafolla, 11th Cir. Mulls Pregnancy Bias in Light of High Court Ruling,
BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com (search for “11th Cir.
Mulls Pregnancy Bias in Light of High Court Ruling,” choose “Bloomberg Law News” under
“Content Types”).
292. 4:16-CV-01604-ACA, 2018 WL 4896346 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 9, 2018).
293. Id. at *1.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at *2.
297. Durham, 2018 WL 4896346, at *2.
298. Id.
299. Id. at *3.
300. Id.
301. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 213 (2015).
302. Id. at 229.
303. Id.
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Because the Durham court was applying the incorrect prima facie case, it
detoured to a discussion of whether unpaid leave was an adverse employment
action. Despite the fact that it seems obvious that an unpaid leave would be
considered an adverse employment action, the court stated: “Given these
disputes, the court cannot determine as a matter of law that Ms. Durham suffered
an adverse employment action.” 304
Despite that conclusion, the court went on to discuss the comparator issue.
First, the court stated that employees who were injured on the job were not
relevant comparators. 305 According to the court, the “PDA does not require an
employer to provide special accommodations to its pregnant employees; instead,
the PDA only ensures that pregnant employees are given the same opportunities
and benefits as nonpregnant employees who are similarly limited in their ability
to work.” 306 The court’s discussion here only cited to pre-Young cases. 307 The
court also distinguished Young because the employer in the instant case only
accommodated one “discrete group of employees, not several different types of
disabilities where ‘many’ found accommodation by UPS.” 308 It is true that UPS
accommodated two other classes of employees besides those injured on the job
(those with disabilities and those who lost their DOT certification), but that fact
was ultimately relevant to the pretext discussion in Young, not the discussion of
whether the fourth element of the prima facie case was met. 309 And more
importantly, the court in Durham ignored the fact that, even if the employer did
not have an explicit policy of accommodating disabled workers, the ADA
requires the employer to do so. Accordingly, the employer would be
accommodating two groups of employees: those injured on the job and those
who have a disability under the ADA.
The court in Portillo v. IL Creations Inc., 310 made the same mistake as the
Durham court. First, the accommodation requested in this case was very
minor—the pregnant plaintiff asked to be allowed to remain seated while at the
cash register—and the employer refused. 311 The court skipped a discussion of
the prima facie case, and instead addressed the employer’s non-discriminatory
reason. 312 The employer argued that it did not permit cashiers to sit while

304. Durham v. Rural/Metro Corp., 4:16-CV-01604-ACA, 2018 WL 4896346, at *3 (N.D. Ala.
Oct. 9, 2018). The court appears to be stating the burden backwards. Given that the employer filed
the motion for summary judgment, it is the employer’s burden to establish that there is no genuine
issue of material fact with regard to any element of the plaintiff’s claim.
305. Id.
306. Id. at *4.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 229–30 (2015).
310. No. 17-1083 (RDM), 2019 WL 1440129 (D.D.C. March 31, 2019).
311. Id. at *5.
312. Id. at *6.
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working the registers because it did not think this was an appropriate
“appearance.” 313 The plaintiff pointed to a comparator who was able to sit while
working as a cashier, but the court (confusingly) stated that this fact does not
answer the ultimate question of whether the employer intentionally
discriminated. 314 Although the court cited Young, it did not engage with the
analysis in Young at all. The court seemed to be requiring a finding of animus,
which is not a requirement of pretext under Young. Another problem exposed in
this case is one I discuss more below: the employer is too small to have a
sufficient number of comparators. I turn to that next.
b. Too Few Comparators
Several of the cases in which plaintiffs lost their PDA accommodation
claims involved employers quite different from UPS, the employer in the Young
case. UPS is a very large employer with several formal policies for the
accommodation process. 315 Many smaller employers do not have formal policies
at all and might not have many employees seeking accommodations for any
reason. Plaintiffs have struggled in these cases to survive the Young analysis.
For instance, in Luke v. CPlace Forest Park SNF, L.L.C., 316 the plaintiff was
a certified nursing assistant (CNA)317 who was pregnant with twins. Because of
her pregnancy, she was put on a thirty-pound lifting restriction, but the employer
refused to accommodate her lifting restriction, asserting that there was no light
duty work available. 318 When she could not return to work without restrictions
because she was still pregnant, the employer fired her. 319 The court did not
engage in a detailed analysis under Young; instead, it stated that the plaintiff was
not qualified to perform the job because the accommodation she requested
would eliminate an essential function of the job, the ability to lift patients. 320
The plaintiff tried to present evidence that some workers were given
accommodations that involved less lifting, but the court responded that in those
situations one employee was simply receiving informal help from another
employee, which is different from an employer-provided accommodation. 321

313. Id.
314. Id.
315. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 211–12 (2015).
316. 747 F. App’x 978 (5th Cir. 2019).
317. Three out of the next four cases discussed involve the health care industry, specifically
CNAs. This is not surprising. As I have argued elsewhere, the realities of many healthcare jobs—
long hours, physical rigor, and sensitive safety issues—make it difficult for employers to find the
right accommodation. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, The Difficult Accommodating Health Care
Workers, 9 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 2–6 (2015).
318. Luke, 747 F. App’x at 978.
319. Id. at 979.
320. Id. at 979–80.
321. Id. at 980.
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Because the plaintiff had not “pointed to any other CNAs that were
accommodated when they had a similar medical restriction on heavy lifting,
there is no evidence that would allow a jury to conclude that [the employer] is
insincere when it says that such lifting is an essential part of the job.” 322 Thus,
unlike the Young case, where UPS had several different classes of employees
who received light duty, this employer was apparently too small to have formal
policies that provided light duty to certain groups of employees. Even
informally, the employer apparently did not provide light duty or
accommodations that would allow CNAs to avoid heavy lifting.
Similarly, in Jackson v. J.R. Simplot Company, 323 the plaintiff was an
operator for a fertilizer plant, a job that required carrying heavy weights and
exposure to chemicals and gases. 324 The plaintiff was undergoing fertility
treatment, and pursuant to her doctor’s advice, she requested two different
accommodations—light duty to avoid heavy lifting and no chemical
exposure. 325 Even though she could point to comparators who were given light
duty when they were unable to meet the lifting requirements of their jobs, none
of those employees also had to avoid exposure to chemicals. 326 Because of this
lack of comparators, the court held that the plaintiff could not prove pretext. 327
The lack of a comparator also doomed the plaintiff in Salmon v. Applegate
Homecare & Hospice, LLC. 328 The plaintiff was a pregnant CNA with a lifting
restriction. 329 The employer told her they could not accommodate her because
there were no light duty positions available; thus, she was terminated once her
leave had expired and she could not return without the lifting restriction. 330 The
court held that the plaintiff’s PDA accommodation claim failed because the
plaintiff could not prove that other CNAs were accommodated regardless of the
availability of light duty work. 331 In other words, because the employer was not
large enough to always reserve light duty work for those who have restrictions,
the plaintiff could not use a CNA who had been given light duty when it was
available as a comparator.
Finally, in Turner v. Hartford Nursing and Rehab, 332 another CNA became
pregnant, and, because of a previous miscarriage, her pregnancy was high risk

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id.
666 F. App’x 739 (10th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 742–43.
No. 1:13-cv-00109-DN, 2016 WL 389987, at *10 (D. Utah Feb. 1, 2016).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *10.
No. 16-cv-12926, 2017 WL 3149143 (E.D. Mich. July 25, 2017).
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so she was restricted from lifting more than ten pounds. 333 The employer refused
to accommodate her lifting restriction, stating that it reserved light duty only for
those who are injured on the job. 334 Because the plaintiff had not been employed
long enough to be entitled to a leave of absence, the employer terminated her. 335
The plaintiff tried to point to evidence that the employer allowed non-pregnant
workers who were injured on the job to get light duty, but because the plaintiff
could not actually identify any such employees who were given light duty for
any reason, her claim failed. 336
Keep in mind that in all of these cases, it is likely that if the employer was
larger, the plaintiff would be able to point to comparators. It is the small size of
the employer that doomed the plaintiffs’ claims. The claims also failed because
the courts were looking for actual comparators, not simply hypothetical
comparators—individuals who would have been accommodated if they had
requested an accommodation.
IV. LESSONS LEARNED—WHERE TO GO FROM HERE
This Part will identify the gaps in protection between the two different
statutes. I will then provide some advice for plaintiffs and their lawyers when
trying to bring a pregnancy accommodation claim under either the ADA or PDA.
A.

The Gaps in Protection

Generally speaking, plaintiffs’ lawyers who are representing pregnant
employees who were denied 337 accommodations should bring a claim under both
the ADA and the PDA, if at all possible. Some scholars have argued that the
ADA claim is often the more straightforward claim to bring. 338 I tend to agree
with that. This subpart will discuss problems plaintiffs have when bringing both
types of claims.
1. When the ADA Will Not Work
ADA coverage will fail in cases where the pregnant employee is not
currently experiencing any complications from the pregnancy, but works in a

333. Id. at *1.
334. Id.
335. Id. at *2.
336. Id. at *6.
337. If possible, it would certainly be better for a pregnant woman to get a lawyer’s help
obtaining accommodations before she is denied a needed accommodation that would lead to her
termination. And in an ideal world, employers would be routinely providing these accommodations
and we would not need to resort to litigation. It certainly is possible that this is already happening
on a large scale and we simply don’t have the data to know that.
338. Zehrt, supra note 24, at 709.
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position where her doctor is recommending preemptive accommodations. 339
This happened in a couple of the cases in my dataset. First, in Brown v. Aria
Health, 340 the plaintiff was a pregnant nurse who asked to be excluded from
rooms where a certain type of x-ray was used and rooms where bone cement was
used. 341 Although the employer tried to accommodate her in various ways, she
eventually resigned. Her disability claim failed because her pregnancy was
routine and without complications. 342
In a similar case, Jackson v. J.R. Simplot Company, 343 the plaintiff was an
operator for a fertilizer plant, a job which required exposure to various chemicals
and gases. When she began fertility treatment, her doctor advised her to avoid
the exposure to chemicals. 344 She would not have been able to prove that she
had a disability; accordingly, she relied on a claim under the PDA. 345
An ADA accommodation claim is also unlikely to be successful in a few
other situations (even if the plaintiff can establish the coverage question—that
complications with her pregnancy constitute a disability under the ADA). Those
situations are if the plaintiff’s restrictions are such that there would not be a
reasonable accommodation that would allow her to perform the essential
functions of her job. 346 For instance, if a pregnant woman works alone in a
position that requires heavy lifting, there might not be an accommodation
possible that would allow her to comply with a lifting restriction. 347 As another
example, if an employee needs to be on bed rest, and her job is not amenable to
working from home, the court is likely to hold that her ADA claim fails because
there is not a reasonable accommodation that would allow her to perform the
essential functions of the job. 348
Finally, an ADA claim is not likely to be successful when the plaintiff is
asking the employer to create a new position. Courts generally hold that a request
for “light duty” work is a request to create a new position. And even when

339. Williams et al., supra note 13, at 136 (describing situations where the ADA won’t work,
such as a police officer who “wants to be taken off the beat and given desk work for fear that she
might be hit hard in the womb during a scuffle,” or an employee who wants to avoid toxins in the
workplace).
340. No. 17-1827, 2019 WL 1745653 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2019).
341. Id. at *2–3.
342. Id. at *5.
343. 666 F. App’x 739 (10th Cir. 2016).
344. Id. at 740.
345. Id. at 741.
346. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining qualified individual as someone who can perform the
essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation).
347. See, e.g., Chino v. Lifespace Cmtys, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1000 (D. Minn. 2016).
348. See, e.g., Everett v. Grady Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 703 F. App’x 938, 945–46 (11th Cir. 2017)
(working from home is not a reasonable accommodation when the job as a program manager
required her to teach classes in person, among other tasks that could not be done at home).
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employers have such positions, they often reserve them for those employees with
workplace injuries. 349 The ADA has not disrupted this norm.
2. When the PDA Has Not Worked
As noted above, the main problem with bringing a PDA case is the lack of
comparators if the employer is small. If smaller employers have never given a
particular accommodation, they will argue that there are no comparators. 350
Advice for getting around this problem is discussed below.
B.

Advice for Litigants
1. Pleading Disability

Despite the fact that we are more than ten years out from the ADAAA, courts
and litigants are still making errors when pleading the disability coverage issue
under the ADA. 351 In order to argue that pregnancy is a disability, plaintiffs’
lawyers should:
• Explain the complications caused by the pregnancy. 352
• If lifting is restricted, make sure to plead that the impairment caused by
the pregnancy substantially limits the major life activity of lifting. 353
• If the pregnant employee’s doctor has issued restrictions because of fear
of miscarriage (especially in cases where there have been prior
miscarriages), the plaintiff should also plead that she is substantially
limited in the major bodily function of reproduction (which is a major life
activity). 354
349. See, e.g., Abbott v. Elwood Staffing Servs., Inc., 44 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1159 (N.D. Ala.
2014).
350. See Widiss, supra note 25, at 1439 (discussing concern about plaintiffs who work for small
employers who may not have had an employee who needed an accommodation pursuant to the
ADA); Williams et al., supra note 13, at 120; Zehrt, supra note 24, at 707–08 (The Court points
out that the UPS policy was an extreme example and suggests that the employer’s refusal to
accommodate a pregnant worker must be more than an isolated event. If only a couple of people
are affected, it seems like it will be difficult to meet the pretext element explained in Young.); Pisko,
supra note 5, at 152 (Young will not help if employers do not provide accommodations to any of
their workers).
351. See generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, Explaining “Not Disabled” Cases Ten Years After
the ADAAA: A Story of Ignorance, Incompetence, and Possibly Animus, 26 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL’Y 383 (2019).
352. Pregnant women still have to work around the default assumption that a perfectly “normal”
pregnancy is not an impairment. But complications associated with the pregnancy can constitute a
disability, so it’s important to point to the complications.
353. Not only is lifting a major life activity under the ADAAA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)
(defining major life activities to include lifting), most of the successful cases discussed above were
able to point to a substantial limitation on lifting.
354. Id. § 12102(2)(B). See also Williams et al., supra note 13, at 116.
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• Mention the demise of the duration requirement; short-term impairments
can still be considered disabilities. 355
Finally, litigants should cite to cases and other sources mentioned in this paper
to support the arguments made here.
2. Claims Under the PDA
As courts struggle to deal with the still relatively new pregnancy
accommodation doctrine post-Young, they are continuing to make mistakes of
which litigants need to be aware so they can hopefully steer the courts in the
right direction. First, remember that the modified prima facie case that the Court
announced in Young requires the plaintiff to prove that: (1) she belongs to the
protected class; (2) she sought accommodation; (3) the employer did not
accommodate her; and (4) the employer did accommodate others “similar in
their ability or inability to work.” 356
Some courts have required elements that are not part of the prima facie case
in Young. For instance, several courts required the plaintiff to prove she was
“qualified,” 357 using the heightened standard of “qualified” under the ADA,
even though proving “qualified” is not technically an element announced in
Young. 358 Litigants should be prepared to counter this argument.
The other element that courts sometimes impute into the Young prima facie
case is a requirement to prove an “adverse employment action.” 359 As noted
above, this is not an element of the prima facie case announced in Young. But
employers will often try to argue that a denial of an accommodation is not always
an adverse employment action. For instance, in Thomas v. Florida Parishes
355. Williams et al., supra note 13, at 135.
356. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 229 (2015).
357. See, e.g., Everett v. Grady Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 703 F. App’x 938, 948–49 (11th Cir. 2017)
(stating that the plaintiff is not qualified even with an accommodation, because the accommodation,
working from home, would eliminate essential functions of the job); Luke v. CPlace Forest Park
SNF, L.L.C., 747 F. App’x 978, 979–80 (5th Cir. 2019) (stating that the plaintiff is not qualified,
because if the employer complied with her lifting restriction, she would be unable to perform the
essential functions of the job as a CNA).
358. See Widiss, supra note 25, at 1143 (stating that Young does not require proof of
qualifications at the prima facie case stage). See also Townsend v. Town of Brusly, 421 F. Supp.
3d 352, 362–63 (M.D. La. 2019) (noting that qualified is not a necessary element of the prima facie
case).
359. See, e.g., Allred v. Home Depot USA, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00483-BLW, 2019 WL 2745731,
at *13 (D. Idaho June 28, 2019) (stating that, even though the Young Court does not explicitly
require an adverse employment action as part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the plaintiff
nevertheless has to prove that she suffered an adverse employment action); Brown v. Aria Health,
No. 17-1827, 2019 WL 1745653, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2019) (not using the Young prima facie
case, court required an adverse employment action, but argued that plaintiff can establish one
because the employer refused to let her follow her doctor’s restrictions); Durham v. Rural/Metro
Corp., 4:16-cv-01604-ACA, 2018 WL 4896346, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 9, 2018) (requiring an
adverse employment action).
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Juvenile Justice Commission, 360 the employer required the plaintiff to attempt a
1.5 mile test run despite her doctor’s orders that she should not run (in part
because she had already attempted the run once while pregnant and ended up in
the hospital with a placental bleed). 361 The employer tried to argue that the
plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action because she was not
terminated or forced on leave. 362 In response, the plaintiff argued that her
injuries from having to perform the 1.5 mile run constituted an adverse
employment action, along with the fact that her workers’ compensation claim
resulted in a reduction in pay. 363 But the court (correctly, in my opinion) held
that an adverse employment action is not an element of the prima facie case
when bringing a claim under the PDA for a failure to accommodate. 364 Pregnant
plaintiffs and their attorneys need to be ready to steer the court in the right
direction by citing to cases and other authorities that explain that there is not a
requirement under Young to prove an adverse employment action.
The other problem with PDA claims (as discussed above) is demonstrating
that there is a comparator when the employer is small. 365 Smaller employers are
unlikely to have official policies (like UPS did in the Young case). They are also
less likely to have many (if any) employees who had the same restrictions as the
pregnant employee’s restrictions. Thus, this makes it difficult to point to a
comparator. However, plaintiffs should be prepared to argue that, because of the
expanded definition of disability under the ADA, the employer would be
required to provide an accommodation if one of its employees had a disability
with limitations similar to the pregnant plaintiff’s. This still might not win the
day, because the Young pretext analysis is stated in terms of percentages—
plaintiff can prove pretext by “providing evidence that the employer
accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to
accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers.” 366 But it allows plaintiffs
to get closer to establishing the necessary comparator.
3. Dealing with the Light Duty Problem
One of the most pressing problems in these cases (under both the ADA and
PDA) is the light duty problem. Although Young dealt with an employer who
offered light duty to three classes of employees—those with workplace injuries,
those with disabilities under the ADA, and those who had lost their DOT
certification 367—most employers only offer light duty to employees who have
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

No. 18-2921, 2019 WL 118011 (E.D. La. Jan. 7, 2019).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. at *7–8.
See cases cited supra Part III.B.2.b.
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 229 (2015).
Id. at 211–12.
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workplace injuries. 368 Courts routinely hold that it does not violate the ADA for
an employer to reserve those light duty jobs for employees with workplace
injuries. 369 In other words, even if an employer has such a light duty position
available, it does not have to give it to a disabled employee as a reasonable
accommodation. Furthermore, some courts will characterize a request for light
duty as a request to create a new position, and creating a new position is never a
reasonable accommodation under the ADA. 370
This fact also creates a problem for PDA claims. If a pregnant employee is
asking for a light duty accommodation, and the employer only gives light duty
to employees with workplace injuries, the plaintiff will have difficulty
establishing pretext under the test announced in Young 371 because there will
likely not be a large percentage of employees that the employer does
accommodate. Importantly, pregnant employees will not be able to point to
disabled employees as comparators in most situations because most employers
(unlike UPS) do not give light duty to disabled employees (unless their
disabilities were caused by a workplace injury).
How can we solve this problem? One simple (albeit perhaps incomplete)
answer—employees and their medical professionals should avoid asking for
“light duty” using those words. “Light duty” is a catch-all term for other jobrelated restrictions. Pregnant plaintiffs would be better off asking for the specific
accommodations they need. Often, light duty means a restriction on lifting. Ask
to be excused from heavy lifting. Sometimes, light duty also means that the
employee needs frequent breaks (if the job is physically rigorous). If that is the
case, the pregnant plaintiff (and her doctor) should ask for more frequent breaks.
In other words, instead of the doctor writing a note that describes the pregnancyrelated complications and advises “light duty,” the doctor should instead write
something like this: “employee is advised not to lift more than twenty pounds
and should have a five-minute, sit-down break every hour.” It is still possible
that the employer might argue that the accommodations would eliminate an
essential function of the job (and therefore the plaintiff is not qualified) or that
there is not a comparator that has received such an accommodation. But avoiding

368. The reason for this is workers’ compensation laws, which require employers to pay for
leaves of absence for employees who cannot work because of a workplace injury. Accordingly,
given the choice between paying an employee to stay home and do nothing, versus paying an
employee to do “light duty” work, most employers will set aside a few “light duty” positions so
they can avoid having to pay employees injured on the job to stay at home and collect a paycheck.
See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the ADA, 47 GA. L. REV. 527, 577 (2013).
369. See id. at 577–78 (discussing this issue).
370. See, e.g., Turner v. Hershey Chocolate USA, 440 F.3d 604, 614 (3d Cir. 2006); Hoskins
v. Oakland Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 227 F.3d 719, 729 (6th Cir. 2000); Fedro v. Reno, 21 F.3d 1391,
1396 (7th Cir. 1994).
371. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 229 (2015).
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the phrase “light duty” should assist the pregnant plaintiff and her lawyer in
arriving at a reasonable accommodation that would work for everyone.
V. CONCLUSION
Five years after the Supreme Court’s opinion in Young v. UPS, and eleven
years after the ADAAA went into effect, pregnant plaintiffs are still struggling
to get the simple accommodations they need to continue working through their
pregnancies. Although the legal landscape has improved for pregnancy
accommodations, there remains work to be done. On the ADA side, we need
courts to understand the breadth of the ADA, and to stop instinctively excluding
pregnancy from the class of individuals who are protected by the ADA.
As for the PDA, I imagine the Supreme Court might have to step in at some
point in the future to clear up some of the confusion caused by the Young case.
Issues that will need resolution include: (1) whether the plaintiff has to prove
she is qualified; 372 (2) whether the plaintiff has to prove she suffered an adverse
employment action; 373 and (3) whether hypothetical comparators count—i.e., if
the employer would have to accommodate an employee with a disability that has
the same restrictions as the pregnant plaintiff, would the pregnant plaintiff be
able to use that hypothetical comparator? This last issue is probably the most
important, because it will affect a plaintiff’s ability to receive accommodations
when she works for a smaller employer. As we know from the FMLA context,
it is often lower-income women who work for smaller employers and smaller
employers tend to provide less generous benefits. 374 Allowing these women to
continue to work instead of being forced on unpaid leave or being terminated is
vitally important.
One legal issue that would affect claims brought under both statutes is
whether an employer should be able to reserve its light duty jobs for employees
with workplace injuries. This privileging of workplace injuries makes sense
because of worker’s compensation mandates but is troubling in the
accommodation context. Because I do not expect a fix to this problem any time
soon, I believe plaintiffs would be well-advised to quit asking for light duty as
an accommodation, and instead, ask for the specific restrictions their doctors are
advising.
372. My answer to this question, simply based on the prima facie case analysis in Young, is
“no,” the plaintiff does not have to prove she is qualified as part of her prima facie case. However,
it is still possible that the employer’s defense (its legitimate non-discriminatory reason) will be that
the plaintiff is not qualified because any accommodation would eliminate essential functions of the
job.
373. Again, my answer to this is “no”—as I’ve argued in the ADA context as well, the failure
to accommodate substitutes for the adverse employment action. See generally Porter, supra note
249, at 1.
374. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Finding a Fix for the FMLA: A New Perspective, A New
Solution, 31 HOFSTRA LABOR & EMP. L.J. 327, 339–40 (2014).
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Finally, one issue this Article does not tackle is whether these protectedclass accommodation mandates (under the ADA and PDA) are the best way to
address pregnant women’s needs for accommodations in the workplace. As I 375
(and others) 376 have argued elsewhere, perhaps universal accommodation
mandates would better serve the needs of pregnant women without creating what
I refer to as “special treatment stigma.” 377 In the interest of space constraints,
that is a topic better left for another day.

375. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Accommodating Everyone, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 85, 108
(2016).
376. See, e.g., Areheart, supra note 52, at 1168–69 (advocating for a universal accommodation
mandate).
377. See Porter supra note 375, at 108–10. See also Nicole Buonocore Porter, Special
Treatment Stigma After the ADA Amendments Act, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 213, 233–38 (2016)
(describing special treatment stigma).

